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PICS in Focus:
A Majority of the Supreme Court Reaffirms
the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious
School Integration Strategies
by MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN*
I. Introduction
In Topeka, Kansas, in the early 1950s, Linda Brown was forced to
travel twenty blocks from her home, through a railroad switchyard, to
attend the all-black Monroe School because Kansas prohibited her from
attending any of its racially segregated all-white schools. In Brown v.
Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution bars public school districts from denying
Linda Brown, and all other "children of the minority group," the ability to
attend a racially-integrated school.1
More than half a century later in Seattle, Washington, Andy Meeks
was unable to transfer to Ballard High School's specialized biotechnology
program because the Seattle School District determined that his enrollment
at that school would be incompatible with its goal of achieving the
remedial, educational, and democratic benefits of a racially integrated
educational environment.
Does the Equal Protection Clause bar a public school district like
Seattle from considering the race of Andy Meeks and other children of the
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Director of the Childlaw and Education Institute and
Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. I would like to thank the University of
California-Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law and the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on
Race, Ethnicity and Diversity for inviting me to present earlier drafts of this Article, and for
providing a forum for feedback. I also would like to thank Tim Cox, Sarah Giauque, Christine
Heaton, and Kelli Sellman for their outstanding assistance with this project.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Equal Protection Clause in the
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
majority group as part of its effort to foster a racially integrated school?
The answer not only hinges upon an understanding of the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause in Brown and its progeny; it
also hinges upon the very nature of the principle of equality itself. Are
Linda Brown and Andy Meeks "like" cases that must be treated in a "like"
manner?
In Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School
Dist. No. 1, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional a school
district's reliance upon an "individual student's race in assigning that
student to a particular school so that racial balance at the school falls within
a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district
as a whole."2 In doing so, the Court reiterated its presumption that such
race-conscious educational classifications violate the Equal Protection
Clause.3
2. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, From Lexis: 127
S. Ct. 2738, 2746*, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508, 517, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8670 (2007) (Roberts, J., plurality
opinion). *All pagination subject to change pending release of the final published version.
According to the Plurality Opinion, the Seattle School District classifies children as white or
nonwhite in order to allocate slots at oversubscribed schools while the Jefferson County district
classifies as black or "other" in order to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule
on transfer requests. Id. at 2754.
3. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D.Ky. 2004)
aff'd, McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 415 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
The Seattle School District No. 1 operated an open choice plan whereby students could apply
to any one of the district's ten secondary schools. Each student was asked to rank each of the
district's high schools in the order of the student's preference. If there was capacity in the
student's preferred school, the district assigned the student to that school. When a school became
oversubscribed, however, the district gave preferential treatment to students who had siblings
already attending the requested school. If the school was still oversubscribed, the district then
considered the race of the student together with the racial composition of the school in making its
school assignment. If the racial composition of a particular high school significantly (initially by
10 percent or more, and eventually by 15 percent or more) deviates from the demography of the
Seattle district's overall student population (which is about 40 percent white and 60 percent
nonwhite), and if the assignment of the student would bring the school's demography closer to
the Seattle district's overall student demography, then the student would be assigned to that
school. After all of the students whose admission to a particular school would bring that school's
racial demography closer to the Seattle district's racial demography were admitted to an
oversubscribed school, the district then assigned students to that school based on the distance
between their residence and the school. A student who resides as little as one hundredth of a mile
closer to the school than another student would be given priority. Finally, if, after considering
student's choice, facilities capacity, racial demography and proximity, the district still had space
for students in an oversubscribed school, assignment to that school is based on lottery. See PICS,
426 F.3d at 1169-70. Also, In Grutter, the Supreme Court previously held that race-conscious
admissions policies violate the Equal Protection Clause unless they are part of an individualized
consideration of each applicant to determine whether admission of that applicant might produce
PICS IN FOCUS [Vol. 35:1
FALL 2007] HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY 3
Nonetheless, as this Article shows, a majority of the Court in PICS
actually rejects a view of the Equal Protection Clause that would treat
Linda Brown and Andy Meeks as "like" cases. Indeed, a careful analysis
of the opinions in PICS reveals that a majority of the Supreme Court has
rejected any view of the Equal Protection Clause and of the principle of
equality that is "color-blind."
This Article begins with that analysis. In Section II, the Article
examines the separate opinions in PICS, and shows that a majority of the
Court's Justices reaffirmed a school district's ability to engage in important
race-conscious integration strategies. Public school districts still may
pursue strategies designed to bring together students of different races in
order to meet the educational needs of their students and to achieve the
educational goals of their schools. Justice Kennedy, who supplied the
Court's fifth vote, writes separately to make clear that school districts may
take race into account, consider the "racial makeup of schools" and pursue
a variety of race-conscious strategies to achieve their compelling interests,
including: (1) "ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of
race;" (2) avoiding or diminishing the "racial isolation" in schools; (3)
achieving a "diverse student body" of which racial diversity is a
component; (4) "offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their
students;" and (5) "bringing together students of diverse... races.",
4
Justice Kennedy also joins the four dissenters in recognizing the relevance
of racial differences in educational opportunities under the Equal Protection
Clause.
In Section III, the Article identifies a variety of race-conscious
integration strategies that school districts still may choose to pursue in the
wake of PICS. Moreover, as demonstrated in Section IV, school districts
may even consider race in assigning their students to particular schools if
they do so as part of nuanced individual evaluation of those students in
order to serve their educational goals, including the goal of teaching racial
literacy. Finally, in Section V, the Article suggests that a majority of the
Supreme Court has begun to recognize the proper place of racial
differences in educational opportunities as part of an authentic application
of the Equal Protection Clause.
the educational benefits of a diverse learning environment. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
I. A Majority of the Court Reaffirms a School District's Ability
to Engage in Race-Conscious Integration Strategies
A. The Court Accepts the Plurality Opinion's Narrow Result But Rejects
Its Broad Reasoning
Justice Roberts begins his Plurality Opinion by declaring that when
the government seeks to distribute burdens or benefits based on "individual
racial classifications," the government must demonstrate that the
classification is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
interest. 5 The Opinion asserts that the Supreme Court previously has
recognized only two interests in the "school context" that are compelling
enough to justify racial classifications: (1) the interest in "remedying the
effects of past intentional discrimination,, 6  and (2) "the interest in
diversity in higher education upheld in Grutter."7 A majority of the PICS
Court concludes that the school districts have not properly asserted either
interest.
First, the Court has allowed racial classifications to remedy past racial
imbalances in schools resulting from past de jure segregation, or proven
acts of de facto segregation. 8 According to the Court in PICS, however,
this interest cannot itself justify racial classifications where a public school
district engages in voluntary race-conscious decision-making. 9 Justice
5. Id. at 2751 (Roberts, J., plurality opinion) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1993)).
6. Id. (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)).
7. Id. at 2753 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328).
8. See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494.
9. See PICS, 551 U.S. at 2761. Compare (opinion of the Court) ("[T]he Seattle public
schools have not shown that they were ever segregated by law" (emphasis added)), with (plurality
opinion) (assuming "the Seattle school district was never segregated by law."). Id. at 2752, 2761.
The dissenters take issue with the Plurality's distinction:
A court finding of de jure segregation cannot be the crucial variable. After all, a
number of school districts in the South that the Government or private plaintiffs
challenged as segregated by law voluntarily desegregated their schools without a
court order-just as Seattle did. See, e.g., Coleman, Desegregation of the Public
Schools in Kentucky--The Second Year After the Supreme Court's Decision, 25 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 254, 256, 261 (1956) (40 of Kentucky's 180 school districts became
desegregated without court orders); Branton, Little Rock Revisited: Desegregation to
Resegregation, 52 J. NEGRO. EDUC. 250, 251 (1983) (similar in Arkansas); Bullock
& Rodgers, Coercion to Compliance: Southern School Districts and School
Desegregation Guidelines, 38 J. POLITICS 987, 991 (1976) (similar in Georgia);
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 40 n.l (1971) (Clarke County, Georgia). See also
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Roberts assumes that the Seattle district was "never segregated by law" or
subject to a desegregation decree. Moreover, although the Jefferson
County district had been the subject of such a decree, that decree was
dissolved when the district was found to have achieved "uniform" status. 10
Second, in Grutter, the Court allowed universities to consider race
when deciding whether to admit a student in order to achieve the
compelling governmental interest in producing the educational benefits of
Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, to John F. Kennedy, President
(Jan. 24, 1963) (hereinafter Kennedy Report), available at
http://www.gilderlehrnan.org/search/collection-pdfs/05/63/0/05630.pdf (all Internet
materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in Clerk of Court's case file)
(reporting successful efforts by the Government to induce voluntary desegregation).
Moreover, Louisville's history makes clear that a community under a court order to
desegregate might submit a race-conscious remedial plan before the court dissolved
the order, but with every intention of following that plan even after dissolution. The
Supreme Court in fact has not treated as merely de facto segregated those school
districts that avoided a federal order by voluntarily complying with Brown's
requirements. The Court has previously done just the opposite, permitting a race-
conscious remedy without any kind of court decree.
Id. at 2810-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. Justice Roberts asserts that "Seattle has never operated segregated schools." PICS, 127
S. Ct. at 2747. That assertion is, however, not accurate. By any measure, the Seattle schools long
have been identifiable by race. Indeed, the Chief Justice acknowledges that because "[m]ost
white students live in the northern part of Seattle, [and] most students of other racial backgrounds
live in the southern part," the district's "racially identifiable" housing pattern has had an effect on
the racial identity of the Seattle schools. Id. As if to acknowledge the factual inaccuracy of his
assertion that Seattle has "never operated segregated schools," Justice Roberts quickly tries to
define "segregated schools" as "legally separate schools for students of different races." But even
by his own definition, Justice Roberts' assertion is still inaccurate. Seattle in fact did operate
"legally separate schools of students of different races." In Seattle, school officials were alleged
to have engaged in "school board policies and actions" that helped to create, maintain and
aggravate racial segregation. Id. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The factual record is clear that
Seattle actually admitted in a legal document that it had maintained racially segregated schools.
In 1956, a memorandum for the Seattle School Board reported that school segregation reflected
not only segregated housing patterns but also school board policies that permitted white students
to transfer out of black schools while restricting the transfer of black students into white schools.
Id. at 2803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Similarly, Justice Roberts's recitation of the history of the Jefferson County schools is not
correct. He writes that Jefferson Country adopted the voluntary student assignment plan at issue
in the case in 2001, after the federal district court dissolved its desegregation decree. Id. at 2749
(Roberts, J. plurality opinion). Yet, the record demonstrates that Jefferson County did not adopt a
new plan after the dissolution of the decree. Id. at 2809 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Rather, the
district merely continued to implement its prior plan, with one exception. Id. The district
discontinued its use of race-based targets to govern admission to its magnet schools, as ordered
by the court. Id. Accordingly, Jefferson County's entire plan was the product of a court order: It
continued the student assignment strategies, and discontinued its magnet school targets, both of
which the court had ordered. Id.
student body diversity.1' The PICS Court, however, defined the
compelling interest upheld in Grutter as an interest in "a specific type of
broad-based diversity" in the "unique context of higher education."' 2 The
Court, therefore, concluded that the "present cases are not governed by
Grutter."
13
In the next section of his Opinion, Justice Roberts addressed the
additional interests that the school districts claimed to be compelling. The
districts proffered interests in reducing racial concentration in their schools,
ensuring that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent
nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable schools, and
fostering the educational and social benefits of a racially diverse learning
environment. Significantly, not even Justice Roberts, in this section of his
Plurality Opinion for just three other members of the Court, could find that
these interests are not compelling.14 He writes that the "debate" as to
whether those interests are "compelling" is "not one [the Court] need
resolve."'
15
Instead, the Court asserts that even if those interests were compelling,
they could not be upheld because "the racial classifications employed by
the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the
educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity."'
16
Writing for five justices including Justice Kennedy, Justice Roberts
proceeds to find that the particular methods employed by the districts
actually had a minimal effect on student assignment, suggesting that means
other than explicit racial classification would have been as effective in
serving their compelling objectives. In addition, the districts "failed to
show that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications
to achieve their stated goals."'
17
Going beyond his narrow holding, Justice Roberts then attempts to
articulate his particular conception of the nature of equality within the
Equal Protection Clause. Joined by only three members of the Court,
however, Justice Roberts claims that the Equal Protection Clause embodies
a timeless constitutional principle that no person shall be treated differently
by the government because of that person's race.18  All racial
11. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268-69 (2003).
12. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2754.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2755-56.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2755.
17. Id. at 2760.
18. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2765.
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classifications-no matter how benign or benevolent they may appear to
be-are "pernicious." 19  The Equal Protection Clause gives to each
individual the right to be free from any government policy that classifies
that individual by his or her race. According to Justice Roberts, the Brown
decision's true import is that it prohibiis school districts from violating the
"personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools ... on a
nondiscriminatory basis., 20 Like Linda Brown, the plaintiffs in PICS were
told by a school district where they "could and could not go to school based
on the color of their skin. 21 Justice Roberts suggests that all such racial
classifications of individuals are violative of the principle of equality in the
Equal Protection Clause. He therefore concludes his opinion with the
statement: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race., 22 A majority of the Court, however,
ultimately rejects this slogan, and the phatic appeal to equality on which it
is based.
B. The Court Accepts the Dissent's Fundamental Reasoning But Rejects
Its Result
Writing for four members of the Court, Justice Breyer begins his
dissent by detailing the history of the efforts by the Seattle and Jefferson
County school districts to integrate their schools. In light of that historic
context, the dissenters find the districts' racial classification to be justified
by at least three compelling interests: (1) the "remedial" interest in
bringing about greater racial integration in their primary and secondary
schools pursuant to a school desegregation order or settlement;23 (2) the
educational interest in "overcoming the adverse educational effects
produced by and associated with highly segregated schools," and
"create[ing] school environments that provide better educational
opportunities for all children;"'24 and (3), the "democratic" interest in
helping to "create citizens better prepared to know, to understand, and to
work with people of all races and backgrounds" 25 and in "helping children
learn to work and play together with children of different racial
backgrounds. 26  According to the dissent, the districts' race-conscious
19. Id. at 2752 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268-69 (2003)).
20. Id. at 2765 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
21. Id. at 2768.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2820, 2823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2823.
26. Id. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
student assignment plans were "narrowly tailored" to serve these
compelling interests because of their "limited and historically-diminishing
use of race; . . . their strong reliance upon other non-race-conscious
elements;" their history and [evolution] over time; the less burdensome
nature of the plans relative to other approved approaches; and the lack of
"reasonably evident altematives. ' 27 Justice Kennedy, however, could not
accept the dissent's "narrow tailoring" analysis, and therefore joined the
Plurality's result.
Nonetheless, the dissent's understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause ultimately carries the day. As Justice Breyer declares: "A
longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal
Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria
to achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not
compel it."'28 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, a
unanimous Court wrote:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well
conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a
whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities.
29
Moreover, in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann,30 the
Court reaffirmed that "school authorities have wide discretion in
formulating school policy, and that as a matter of educational policy school
authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the
schools is desirable quite apart from any constitutional requirements."
Indeed, in McDaniel v. Barresi, a case decided the same day as Board v.
Swann, a group of parents challenged a race-conscious student assignment
plan that the school district had voluntarily adopted as a remedy without a
court order.31 The plan required that each elementary school in the district
maintain 20 percent to 40 percent enrollment of African-American
students, corresponding to the racial composition of the district.32 The
27. Id. at 2829-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 2811.
29. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
30. N.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Swam, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (citing Swam v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 16).
31. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39,41(1971).
32. See Barresi v. Browne, 175 S. E. 2d 649, 650-651 (Ga. 1970).
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Supreme Court upheld the plan.33
According to the dissent, Board v. Swann is based upon a well-
established interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment: the objective of
those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause was to forbid practices that
lead to racial exclusion. "The Amendment sought to bring into American
society as full members those whom the Nation had previously held in
slavery.,
34
Justice Breyer concludes that those who drafted the Equal Protection
Clause with this basic purpose in mind would have understood the legal
and practical difference between the use of race-conscious criteria in
defiance of that purpose, namely to keep the races apart, and the use of
race-conscious criteria to further that purpose, namely to bring the races
together. 35 The Constitution almost always forbids governmental actions
that employ racial classifications to exclude, separate or subjugate
members of the minority race. The Equal Protection Clause, however, is
"more lenient" of government efforts to include, integrate or de-subjugate
members of that race.36
C. Justice Kennedy's Dispositive Opinion Adopts the Dissent's
Fundamental Reasoning But Accepts the Plurality's Narrow Result
Justice Kennedy rejects the Plurality's approach as "inconsistent in
both its approach and its implications with the history, meaning, and reach
of the Equal Protection Clause. 37 In his critical, separate opinion, Justice
Kennedy agrees with the four dissenters that the interests asserted by the
33. See McDaniel, 402 U.S. at 41.
34. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, From Lexis: 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2815*, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508, 517, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8670 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
*All pagination subject to change pending release of the final published version. (citing
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873)) ("[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one
pervading purpose found in [all the Reconstruction amendments]... we mean the freedom of the
slave race"); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment]
is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a
race recently emancipated ... all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.").
35. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing R. SEARS, A UTOPIAN EXPERIMENT IN KENTUCKY:
INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL EQUALITY AT BEREA, 1866-1904 (1996) (describing federal funding,
through the Freedman's Bureau, of race-conscious school integration programs). See also R.
FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1862-77, 51 (1974) (describing the use of
race-conscious remedies); Harlan, Desegregation in New Orleans Public Schools During
Reconstruction, 64 AM. HIST. REv. 663, 664 (1962) (same); W. VAUGHN, SCHOOLS FOR ALL:
THE BLACKS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1877, 111-116 (1974) (same)).
36. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
districts in these cases are "compelling," and could therefore justify broad
racial classifications and even narrowly tailored, race-conscious
assignments of individual students.38 He concludes that "[d]iversity,
depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a
school district may pursue." 39 He further finds related compelling interests
in: (1) ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of race; (2)
reaching Brown's objective of equal educational opportunity; (3) refusing
to accept the "status quo of racial isolation in schools; ''40 (4) altering
"student-body composition of certain schools" that interfere with the
"objective of offering an equal education to all of their students; ' '41 (5)
"bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races; 4 2 (6)
"remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and ... increasing
diversity in higher education; '43 (7) avoiding racial isolation;" 44 (8)
achiev[ing] a diverse student population;"45 and, (9) "bringing together
students of different racial, ethnic and economic backgrounds.4 6
Although he finds the district's asserted interests in the educational
and societal benefits of a racially-diverse learning environment to be
compelling, Justice Kennedy concludes-with the Plurality-that their
methods of achieving those interests are not "narrowly tailored. '47 Justice
Kennedy finds that Jefferson County's assignment plans are "broad and
imprecise," inconsistently applied and even "ad hoc."48 The district also
failed to make "clear" who makes the assignment decisions, what
"oversight" is employed, and "the precise circumstances in which an
assignment decision will or will not be made on the basis of race. 4 9
Seattle, for its part, failed to "make an adequate showing" that its "blunt
distinction" between white and nonwhite students furthers its own asserted
remedial, educational and democratic interests because a school with 50
percent white students and 50 percent African-American students would
qualify as "balanced," but a school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at2791.
41. Id. at 2792.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2793.
44. Id. at 2797.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2791.
48. Id. at 2790.
49. Id.
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percent African-American, 25 percent Latino and 20 percent white students
would not be racially balanced.5 °
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy concludes that school districts must be
"free to devise race-conscious measures" to achieve their compelling
interests in offering an equal educational opportunity to all students.5'
Such race-conscious measures include: strategic site selection of new
schools, drawing attendance zones in recognition of neighborhood
demographics; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting
students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollment,
performance and other statistics by race.52 Justice Kennedy asserts that
each one of these mechanisms is "race-conscious. 53 Yet, significantly, he
concludes that none of them would "demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible. 54
If a school district is determined to employ a method of achieving its
objectives that treats each student in a different fashion solely on the basis
of a systematic, individual typing by race, however, that district must
undergo strict scrutiny. Yet, even a classification of burdens and benefits
to individual students based on their race would be constitutional if the
district can establish that its classification is "the last resort" to achieve its
compelling interest.55 In doing so, the district would have to show that it
could not have achieved its objectives through "facially-neutral means" or
through a "more nuanced, individual evaluation of student needs and
student characteristics that might include race as a component" as
envisioned by Grutter in light of the different "age of the students, the
needs of the parents, and the role of the schools.,
56
D. A Majority of the Court Recognizes Compelling Governmental
Interests That Justify Race-Conscious Integration Strategies
In PICS, a majority of the Court recognized as compelling a school
district's interest in creating a racially diverse educational environment.
Justice Breyer's dissent for four members of the Court finds compelling
remedial, educational and democratic interests in a racially diverse
educational environment.57 Justice Kennedy, as well, concludes that a
50. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2790-91.
51. Id. at 2792.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2793.
57. Id. at 2822-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
racially diverse educational environment is a compelling objective. 58
In addition, a majority of the PICS Court concludes that school
districts have wide latitude to engage in race-conscious integration
strategies that do not rely upon racial classifications of individual students.
Furthermore, school districts also may employ student assignment
strategies that consider the race of individual students where the district
shows that those strategies are narrowly tailored to achieve their objectives.
The Court's majority goes further to indicate that a school district may
engage in broad race-conscious strategies designed to achieve their interest
in equal educational opportunities without being subjected to strict
scrutiny, and without violating the core principles of equality in the Equal
Protection Clause.
III. The PICS Court Enables School Districts to Pursue a Variety
of Race-Conscious Strategies to Serve Their Compelling
Interests in Fostering Racially Integrated Schools
In his separate Opinion, Justice Kennedy declares that school districts
are "free to devise race-conscious measures" in shaping the racial
composition of their schools in order to remove impediments to equal
educational opportunities.59 If these measures "address the problem in a
general way without treating each student in a different fashion solely on
the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race" these measures will not
be subject to strict scrutiny. 60 Although these methods of achieving a
racially diverse school are race-conscious, school districts may employ
them without demonstrating that they are narrowly tailored to achieve any
compelling interests. Rather, Justice Kennedy indicates that school
districts must be given broad deference in their efforts to achieve a racially
integrated educational environment.6'
In the absence of strict scrutiny, these methods will be upheld so long
as they are rationally related to the district's legitimate goals. Accordingly,
Justice Kennedy suggests that school boards:
may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse
backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site
selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a
58. Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2792-93.
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targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not
lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each
student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of
them will demand strict scrutiny be found permissible.
62
The use of these strategies by some school districts may result in some
racial integration. Where school districts seek to achieve the benefits of
racial integration, they should at least experiment with these strategies to
determine whether they will be successful.6 3 Their experimentation will
not be scrutinized strictly by the courts. Unfortunately, however, there is
little evidence that the use of these broad, race-conscious integration
strategies will adequately achieve the objectives that Justice Kennedy finds
compelling for most school districts.64
A. Strategic Site Selection and Attendance Zoning for Specially
Resourced Magnet Schools and Programs
Justice Kennedy indicates that before employing the "last resort" of
student assignment based on race, a school district should attempt to meet
its goal of fostering student body diversity through means such as strategic
site selection and attendance zoning for new, specially resourced programs
and schools. 65 To avoid racial concentration in its schools, for example, a
school district might create merit-based academic, avocational and
vocational magnet programs. These programs can help each school address
racial diversity issues by encouraging students to travel outside of their
geographic attendance zone to participate in a specific magnet program.
Dual-language Spanish magnet schools can be a particularly effective
way of achieving racial diversity where the program attracts an equal
number of English speaking students and students for whom Spanish is
62. Id. at 2792.
63. Id.
64. As Justice Breyer shows, Seattle and Louisville are excellent examples of the
ineffectiveness of these methods. Id. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As to "strategic site
selection," Seattle has built one new high school in the last forty-four years. In fact, six of the
Seattle high schools involved in the PICS case were built by the 1920s; the other four were open
by the early 1960s. Id. at 2828. Louisville tried "drawing" neighborhood "attendance zones" on
a racial basis. Id. That method worked only when forced busing was also part of the plan. Id.
Both Louisville and Seattle also tried "allocating resources for special programs." Id. They both
experimented with specially resourced "magnet school" programs, but the limited desegregation
effect of these efforts extends at most to those few schools to which additional resources are
granted. Id. In addition, there is no evidence from the experience of these school districts that it
will make any meaningful impact. Id. Louisville and Seattle also tried "recruiting faculty" on the
basis of race, but only as one part of a broader assignment program. Id.
65. Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
their first language. The magnet may pull white students away from their
geographic attendance zones and into a school with a significant number of
Hispanic or Latino students for whom English may not be their first
language. The program's goal is foreign language acquisition, but its
methods may have the collateral benefit of achieving a racially diverse
classroom.
In Illinois School District 112, for example, the district operates a
dual-language immersion program that has produced both foreign language
acquisition learning outcomes and racial diversity.66 The district educates
approximately four thousand students in eight elementary schools and three
middle schools. The district as a whole is predominately white,67 but more
than 62 percent of the students who reside in the northern section of the
district are Hispanic.68  In 1996, the district began a dual-language
(Spanish-English) immersion program. The program was housed in one
school building in the predominately Hispanic northern attendance zone,
and in two school buildings in the predominately white southern attendance
zone. 69 The program requires school administrators to assign an equal
number of students who are Spanish-dominant and English-dominant to the
same classroom. 70  The program's goals include high academic
achievement in Spanish and English, and "cross-cultural awareness. 71 In
2006 and 2007, 570 of the district's students participated in the program,
which enticed English-dominant students to choose to attend school in the
predominantly Spanish-dominant attendance zone, and enticed Spanish-
dominant students to choose to attend schools in the predominately
English-dominant attendance zone. The result of the program was that the
dual language classrooms throughout the district had equal numbers of
English and Spanish dominant children. As a collateral benefit, these
classrooms were racially diverse as well.
The program assesses its students to determine whether its educational
objectives have been met.72 Students from both language backgrounds
66. More than 80 percent of the district's students are white. See Ill. Sch. Dist. 112 State
Report Card (2005), http://www.nssdl 12.org/reportcards/schoolrprtcrdO5/ot05src.pdf
[hereinafter, "Report Card"].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69 Melissa K. Wolf, North Shore School District 112, Dual Language Immersion Program
(2005), http://www.nssd1 12.org/curriculum/frameworkpdfs/DLpowerpoint.
ppt#229,17,1nterpretingtheNCE.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. See also North Shore School District 112, Highland Park, IL Homepage,
http://www.nssd112.org/curriculum/dlassessments.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
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have enjoyed tremendous academic success. 73 Spanish-dominant children
in Kindergarten through eighth grade acquire English language skills at a
more rapid rate than their Spanish-dominant peers in traditional bilingual
programs. 74 English-dominant students acquire Spanish language skills at a
highly accelerated rate relative to their peers. 75 Moreover, both Spanish-
dominant and English-dominant students show great academic success in
cognitive areas other than language.76 In fact, the evidence indicates that
English-dominant students in the dual language program perform better on
state standardized tests in Math and English than their English-dominant
peers in the same district.77 Accordingly, this type of magnet program is a
race-neutral strategy for producing dual-language acquisition which can in
some districts also produce the benefits of racial integration.
Yet, "there is little evidence that such magnet school programs" alone,
whatever their other merits, can achieve effective racial integration. Even
magnet programs receiving federal funding through the Department of
Education's Magnet Schools Assistance Program ("MSAP") have had only
modest success in achieving racial integration. The Department of
Education's most recent evaluation of the MSAP acknowledged that MSAP
recipients "overall made only modest progress in reducing minority group
isolation" in the individual magnet schools targeted by the MSAP grant.78
The Department of Education's report explains that the relative lack of
integration success may be due to the fact that the districts were prohibited
from using race-conscious student assignment plans. The Report concludes
that "limitations placed on the use of race as a factor in selection of
students" are a "potentially important factor" that may "help explain why
more than 40 percent of desegregation-targeted schools were not successful
in making progress on their desegregation objective. 79 Magnet programs
73. See WOLF, supra note 69.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See N. Shore Sch. Dist. 112, supra note 72.
78. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE MAGNET SCHOOLS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM,
1998 GRANTEES VII-3 (2003) (defining "minority group isolation" as the degree to which a
school enrolled more than 50 percent minority students). In 43 percent of the 294 schools
targeted for desegregation during the grant cycle, the degree of minority group isolation (MGI)
actually increased or remained the same. Id. at xiii. The remaining 57 percent of schools
succeeded in reducing minority group isolation, but 35 percent of the targeted schools did so by
less than five percentage points. Id. at xii-xiii.
79. Id. at IV-I 1. The Report further explains, "[I]n District C, for example, the project
director contended that it is difficult to meet the desegregation objective when school officials are
prohibited from taking race into account in making school assignments, even though
administrators did consider eligibility for reduced-price lunches and reading scores instead." Id.
simply cannot be as finely tailored to achieve the educational benefits of
racial diversity as race-conscious school assignment designed to achieve
precisely these benefits. Racial diversity is at best a collateral benefit of
the magnet program.
B. Socio-economic Integration Strategies
There is great debate about whether student assignment or admission
based on socio-economic status is an effective race-neutral method of
achieving a racially diverse educational environment. °  Significantly,
Justice Kennedy does not include socio-economic integration strategies
among the methods that school districts must exhaust before using explicit
racial classifications. Perhaps Justice Kennedy eliminated that method
because he is aware of the overwhelming data demonstrating that reliance
on socio-economic status does not advance the goal of racial integration in
schools.
Because there are instances in which student admission based on
socio-economic status can have the collateral benefit of enhancing racial
diversity, however, objectors to a school district's voluntary integration
program may still argue that the district must first experiment with such a
race-neutral strategy. In the Seattle district, for instance, the northern
Seattle area contains a majority of "white" students and is "historically
more affluent., 81 The southern Seattle area is necessarily less affluent.
Thus, moving more affluent students south, and less affluent students north,
could possibly provide a more diverse student body.82 A report issued by
the Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education,
entitled Achieving Diversity: Race-Neutral Alternatives in American
Education (2004), however, concludes that there is no evidence showing
that socio-economic-based measures of school assignment or site selection
actually succeed in achieving racial integration.83 The Office for Civil
at VI-13.
80. See, e.g., CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES' EXPERIENCES (The Civil Rights
Project, Harvard Univ. 2003); WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET. AL., EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 177 (2005); Richard Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471, 474 (1997); Mark Satin, Economic-Class-Based
Affirmative Action: The Elites Loathe It, the People Want It, Radical Middle Newsletter,
(July/August 2003), available at http://www.radicalmiddle.com/x-affirmativeaction; Alec
MacGillis, Basing Affirmative Action on Income Changes Payoff, THE SUN, May 25, 2003, at I C;
RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
81. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1166 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
82. Id. at 1188.
83. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, RACE
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Rights Report profiles the following five school districts as models for
using socio-economic-based assignments as a race-neutral alternative to
achieving student body diversity: Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina;
Wake County, North Carolina; San Francisco, California; Brandywine,
Delaware; and La Crosse, Wisconsin.
84
None of the five districts that adopted socio-economic policies
succeeded in eliminating school segregation. In fact, the adoption of socio-
economic-based policies increased segregation in two of the districts, and
introduced or increased racial isolation in three of the districts.85 Two of
the five districts-Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Wake County-experienced
increases in the percentage of students in segregated schools.86 The three
remaining districts-San Francisco, Brandywine, and La Crosse-only
modestly reduced the percentage of students attending segregated schools,
and none actually succeeded in eliminating segregation. 87  Moreover,
where schools with intensely segregated populations of at least 90 percent
minority enrollment exist, socio-economic status assignment plans actually
increased racial concentration.
88
The research suggests that the use of socio-economic status for school
assignments alone has not succeeded in desegregating public schools,
particularly in larger districts. 89 Based on that evidence, the use of socio-
economic status for school assignments will likely not prove to be a
workable alternative for school districts seeking to further their compelling
interest in racial integration.
Even if student assignment based on socio-economic status were
workable and in certain cases resulted in enhanced racial diversity, there is
no doubt that the use of socio-economic status is less tailored to achieve the
goal of meaningful racial diversity than the use of racial diversity itself.
The use of socio-economic status as a proxy for racial status is both
overbroad and under-inclusive. Accordingly, the fit between the "means"
of student assignment based on socio-economic status and the "end" of
racially diverse educational institutions is not as precise as the fit between
the "means" of student assignment based on race and the "end" of racially
diverse educational institutions. If the "compelling interest" that drives
student assignment is producing the educational benefits of a racially
NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 61-62, 66-71 (2004).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
diverse student body, then the method of socio-economic integration is not
tailored to serve that interest.
IV. Public School Districts Can Meet Their Burden of Proving
That Assigning a Meaningful Number of Racially Diverse
Students to an Educational Environment is Narrowly Tailored to
Achieving the Compelling Interest in Teaching Racial Literacy to
Secondary School Students
After PICS, public school districts may still employ explicit racial
classifications of individual students, so long as they can show that their
classifications are narrowly tailored to achieve their compelling interests in
the benefits of a diverse student population. 90 As a majority of the Court,
including Justice Kennedy, makes clear in PICS, school districts may still
engage in a "nuanced, individual evaluation" of student characteristics
including their race, to meet a school's compelling educational needs.
91
A. Public School Districts Have a Compelling Interest in Teaching
Racial Literacy
The concept of racial literacy includes: an understanding of the
biological and social components of race itself; an understanding of the
history of race throughout the world and in America; an understanding of
the current and projected racial composition of the world, the country, the
state, the county, the school district and the school; an understanding of the
relationship vel non between race and politics, law, society, geography,
language, culture, religion, family, and education; an understanding of the
connection vel non between race and perceptions of the world and one's
self; an understanding of the racial prejudices and biases that may exist in
each student; an understanding of the strategies that may be used to
overcome such prejudices and biases; and an understanding of the value of
racial differences and racial tolerance.
92
90. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
91. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, From Lexis: 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2793*, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508, 567, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8670 (2007) (Roberts, J., plurality
opinion). *All pagination subject to change pending release of the final published version. PICS,
127 S. Ct. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment).
92. In From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92, 114 (2004), Lani
Guinier has defined "racial literacy" in the different context of developing a sophisticated
understanding and reaction to race in America. She writes that "racial literacy is
epiphenomenal ... is contextual rather than universal ... depends on the engagement between
action and thought... is about learning rather than knowing... is an interactive process in which
race functions as a tool of diagnosis, feedback and assessment." Id. See also Devon W. Carbado
& Mitu Gulati; What Exactly is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1149, 1153-1154 (2003)
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Racial literacy is hardly a novel educational objective. John Dewey
concluded that encouraging students to understand and confront racial
differences is a particularly critical function to be performed by education
in the American Democracy. 93 Educational philosophers and practitioners
have long recognized that because of the pervasiveness of racial issues
throughout the curriculum, students must receive an educational foundation
in racial literacy.94 Moreover, local public school districts, under direction
from their states, commonly include racial understanding as a required
component of their curriculum and instructional practices. 95  The
legitimacy of the educational judgment that racial literacy is an essential
learning outcome for American secondary school students, therefore, is
unassailable.96
In Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized that the promotion of
specific educational benefits that flow from such a diverse student
population is a compelling governmental interest. 97 The Court identified
no less than thirteen "substantial" governmental benefits that flow from a
diverse student population: (1) overarching educational benefits; (2) an
increase in the "robust" exchange of ideas; (3) cross-racial understanding;
(4) breaking down racial stereotypes; (5) livelier, more spirited,
enlightening and interesting classroom discussions; (6) the promotion of
learning "outcomes;" (7) better preparation of students to work and interact
in an "increasingly diverse" society and workforce; (8) better preparation
as professionals in an "increasingly global marketplace;" (9) helping the
("Central to racial diversity ... is the notion that how we experience, think about, and conduct
ourselves in society is shaped, though not determined, by our race").
93. JOHN DEWEY, EDUCATION IN DEMOCRACY, reprinted in CAHN, CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 288-93 (1997).
94. NEIL POSTMAN, THE END OF EDUCATION: REDEFINING THE VALUE OF SCHOOL (1995).
95. See BRUCE M. MITCHELL & ROBERT E. SALSBURY, MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION IN
THE U.S.: A GUIDE TO POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN THE 50 STATES passim (2000) (citing states
that have racial literacy programs, persons overseeing such programs, funding for programs, or
other similar equity programs: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Numerous other states, although lacking a
specific program, stress multi-racial learning within the classrooms through efforts such as
teacher education and local decision-making. Id.
96. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); McFarland v. Jefferson County Public
Schools, 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff'd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd sub
nom. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2753 (recognizing the legitimacy of the objective of teaching racial
literacy in the Jefferson County and Seattle School Districts).
97. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (noting that the law school's concept
of critical mass must be "defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce.").
military to fulfill its very mission of "national security;" (10) facilitating
the "diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of
higher education" to be accessible to all individuals and thereby sustaining
our "political and cultural heritage;" (11) fostering the effective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups which is vital to
becoming one nation; (12) supporting the training in law school for diverse
national leaders and thereby cultivating leaders with legitimacy; and, (13)
developing attorneys of diverse races and ethnicities who will be able, in
turn, to help all members of a "heterogeneous society" succeed.98
These substantial benefits include racial literacy in the form of cross-
racial understanding, breaking down racial stereotypes, learning outcomes
regarding race, preparation to operate in a "diverse" society, and the
"diffusion of knowledge" about racial diversity. 99  In evaluating the
relevance of diversity to educational objectives, the Court focused
principally on the "learning outcomes" that a diverse student body
provides.100 Those learning outcomes are derived not only from having
diverse viewpoints represented in the "robust exchange of ideas,"' ' but
also from the presence of racially diverse students in the classroom as a
method of challenging racial stereotypes.
10 2
A majority of the Court in PICS also recognized the state's compelling
interest in fostering the educational benefits of student body diversity.
Justice Breyer's Opinion for four Justices declares that among the
compelling interests that justify race-conscious decision making is "an
effort to create citizens better prepared to know, to understand and to work
with people of all races.... , Significantly, Justice Kennedy, as well,
declares that race-conscious strategies can be employed when narrowly
tailored to achieve the "goal of bringing together students of diverse
,,1 04backgrounds and races .... He further declares that school districts
may consider the "racial makeup of schools" and the "racial composition"
98. Id. See also MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & SHERELYN R. KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS 527 (2005).
99. See KAUFMAN & KAUFMAN, supra note 98.
100. For an outstanding empirical analysis of the achievement gains produced by a racially
diverse educational environment, see Roslyn A. Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of
Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L.
Rev. 1513, 1517, 1546 (2003) ("desegregated education leads to higher achievement."). See also
PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2776.
101. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-30.
102. Id. at 330, 333.
103. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment).
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of students in order to encourage a diverse student body.105
Public school districts may readily articulate the precise and
compelling educational benefits produced by a diverse elementary and
secondary school population. These benefits include the acquisition of
racial literacy. 06  A vast amount of social science research has been
generated indicating the educational benefits of a racially diverse
educational environment generally, and the benefits of such an
environment to the production of racial literacy. 10 7 The Supreme Court also
105. Id.
106. Academic research has shown that inter-group contact reduces prejudice and supports
the values of citizenship. See Derek Black, Comment, The Case for the New Compelling
Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 923, 951-52 (2002)
(collecting academic research demonstrating that interpersonal interaction in desegregated
schools reduces racial prejudice and stereotypes, improving students' citizenship values and their
ability to succeed in a racially diverse society in their adult lives).
107. See, e.g., Robert E. Slavin & Eileen Oickle, Effects of Cooperative Learning Teams on
Student Achievement and Race Relations: Treatment by Race Interactions, 54 SOC. OF EDUC.
174, 178 (1981) (finding that both white and African-American students gained academically
from cooperative diverse learning environments); Robert Slavin, Cooperative Learning and
Intergroup Relations, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 633 (James
A. Banks ed. 2001) (offering an overview of intergroup research studies and concluding that
students in ethnically diverse education settings receive long-lasting social, cross-ethnic
friendships and improved student achievement); Amy Stuart Wells et al., How Desegregation
Changed Us: The Effects of Racially Mixed Schools on Students and Society, in IN SEARCH OF
BROWN (Harvard Univ. Press 2005) (reporting positive overall societal results from integration of
schools by studying a particular class from 1980, including students who are less racially
prejudiced and more open to people of different backgrounds); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup
Contact: Theory, Research, and New Perspectives, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 770 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004) (arguing that proper
education prepares students better for democratic citizenship); Patricia Gurin et al., The Benefits
of Diversity in Education for Democratic Citizenship, 60 J. OF SOC. ISSUES, 17, 32 (2004)
(presenting studies that examine and conclude that diversity in student bodies, although altered by
personal experiences with the diverse groups, generally create students that are better suited for
"democratic citizenship"); Amy Guttman, Unity and Diversity in Democratic Multicultural
Education, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 71 (James A. Banks ed., 2004)
(presenting that multicultural education furthers democratic ideals through teaching tolerance and
role that cultural differences have had in the shaping of society); Walter G. Stephan & Cooke
White Stephan, Intergroup Relations in Multicultural Education Programs, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 782 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004) (affirming
that one goal of multicultural education is to improve relations among ethnic groups and
reviewing the processes that lead to such change); Janet Ward Schofield, Fostering Positive
Intergroup Relations in Schools, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
799 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004) (agreeing that multicultural education can improve ethnic
relations among students, primarily because young students have their first experiences with
others from different ethnic backgrounds in schools, and outlining policies to effectively foster
those relationships); James A Banks, Democratic Citizenship Education in Multicultural
Societies, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 10 (James A. Banks ed., 2004) (arguing
that proper education can prepare students better for democratic citizenship); Black, supra note
106, at 944-47 (noting the vast amount of research affirming the positive effects of diverse
educational environments); Genva Gay, Curriculum Theory and Multicultural Education, in
has recognized that the educational benefits of a racially diverse school
extend to all students in that school: "attending an ethnically diverse school
may help... [in] preparing minority children for citizenship in our
pluralistic society while, we may hope, teaching members of the racial
majority to live in harmony and mutual respect with children of minority
heritage."'
10 8
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 32-33 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed.
2004) (reviewing scholarship on the value of multicultural education and defining multicultural
education as an idea that recognizes the importance of ethnic and cultural diversity in educational
settings); Gloria Ladson-Billings, Culture Versus Citizenship, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP
EDUCATION 122 (James A. Banks ed., 2004) (finding that part of the educator's responsibility is
to teach civic and democratic ideals); Janet Wart Schofield, Review of Research on School
Desegregation's Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 597 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks
eds., 2004) (providing a comprehensive survey of the major social and statistical studies on
desegregation and the impact on African-American students, Hispanic students, and white
students from 1975 through 1991, and concluding that the positive effects of desegregation
include, inter alia, improved reading skills for African-American youth and higher college
graduation rates leading to higher employment income); Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain,
Perpetuation Theory and the Long-term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. OF EDUC.
RES., 531, 532, 540, 546, 552 (1994) (reviewing twenty-one studies of the impacts of
desegregation and integrated learning environments, concluding that African American students
attending desegregated schools set future employment goals higher than in segregated schools, a
higher ratio of African-American students from desegregated schools attain higher education,
African-American students from desegregated schools are more likely to be employed in white-
collar/professional careers); Eric A. Hanushek, et al., New Evidence About Brown v. Board of
Education: The Complex Effects of School Racial Composition on Achievement 23-24 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W8741, 2004) (studying academic achievement
and concluding that African-American achievement, particularly in mathematics, is improved
through diverse learning); Mickelson, supra note 100, at 1560 (concluding that all students
benefit from diverse schools, African-American-identified schools have negative effects on all
students, and even desegregated schools may have disproportionate education based on race due
to other social and academic factors); Maureen Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student
Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 753 (1998) (providing an overview
of the social science literature regarding diversity and desegregation, the resulting impact on
students, and finding that the reliable findings are typically positive); Jomills Henry Braddock
II & Tamela McMulty Eitle, The Effects of School Desegregation, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 828 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004)
(providing an overview of the social science research regarding the effects of desegregation
and concluding that modest, but significant, improvements exist for African-American
students); THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE IMPACT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY ON
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES; CAMBRIDGE, MA SCHOOL DISTRICT 12 (2002), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/diversity/cambridge-diversity.pdf, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, THE IMPACT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY ON EDUCATIONAL
OUTCOMES: LYNN, MA SCHOOL DISTRICT 11 (2002), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/diversity/lynnreport.pdf
108. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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B. Race-Conscious and Nuanced Individual Student Assignment
Strategies Can Be Narrowly Tailored to Serve the Compelling
Educational Interest in Teaching Racial Literacy
The Supreme Court thus has recognized that states have a compelling
interest in encouraging their educational institutions to provide
"educational benefits" to their citizens. 1°9 The Court also has recognized
that a school's use of student enrollment to produce a meaningful number
of diverse students within an educational institution can be narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling governmental interest in producing these
educational benefits." 0
In the wake of PICS, school districts seeking to show that their
classifications and assignments of individual students based on race are
narrowly tailored to serve their compelling interests must demonstrate that:
(1) their classifications are part of a carefully monitored and nuanced,
individualized consideration of student characteristics including race; and,
(2) their pursuit of alternative race-neutral strategies has not been or would
not be successful in achieving their precise, compelling interests. Neither
of these considerations should frustrate a school district's efforts to conduct
a nuanced individual consideration of student characteristics to achieve its
goal of teaching racial literacy.
1. Individualized Nuanced Consideration of Student Characteristics
Grutter emphasized the importance of the individualized consideration
of each student, declaring that in the context of a race-conscious university
admissions program, such consideration:
must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is
evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's
race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. The
importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a
race-conscious admissions program is paramount."'
Similarly, Justice Kennedy wrote in PICS that the "nuanced,
individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might
include race as a component," would allow a school district to tailor the
109. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 268 (2003).
110. Id. See also PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2824-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added).
racial composition of its schools to meet its precise pedagogical goals."1 2
One may advance the precise educational outcome of teaching racial
literacy by assigning pedagogically meaningful numbers of racially diverse
students to a school or classroom. Racial diversity in the high school
environment thus has a particularly meaningful role in fostering the precise
objective of teaching racial literacy.'" 3
The educational judgment that racial literacy is best taught in a
racially diverse school environment is not only reasonable; it is virtually
undisputed. Educational professionals have determined that a uniquely
effective method of teaching racial literacy requires students to interact
with peers from different racial backgrounds." 4 Secondary school
educational professionals understand that racial literacy cannot be taught
through the monolithic delivery of information to passive students. 1 5
Rather, teaching racial literacy requires prompting students to confront the
personal and political nature of race and racism in their educational
environment. ' 16
The professional judgment that racially diverse educational
environments are indispensable to teaching racial literacy is not a pretext
for individual racial classifications or for racial engineering. Rather,
empirical evidence shows that interpersonal interaction in desegregated
112. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
113. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that when
racial diversity is the compelling interest "[t]he only relevant criterion, then, is a student's race;
individualized consideration beyond that is irrelevant to the compelling interest"); Brewer v. W.
Irondequoit Ctr.. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) ("If reducing racial isolation is-
standing alone-a constitutionally permissible goal.... then there is no more effective means of
achieving that goal than to base decisions on race."). See also Jeff Sapp, Cooperative Learning:
A Foundation for Race Dialogue, 30 TEACHING TOLERANCE, Fall 2006, available at
http://www.tolerance.org.teach/.magazine/features.jsp?is=39&ar-684; Spencer Kagan, The
Power to Transform Race Relations, 30 TEACHING TOLERANCE, Fall 2006, available at
http://www.tolerance.org/teach/printar.jsp?p=0&ar=684&pi-ttm; Otis Grant, Teaching and
Learning About Racial Issues in the Modern Classroom, 5 RACIAL PEDAGOGY, 2003, available
at http://radicalpedagogy.icaap.org/content/issue5_ 1/02_grant.html.
114. See, e.g. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE IMPACT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY
ON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES; CAMBRIDGE, MA SCHOOL DISTRICT 12 (2002), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/diversity/cambridge-diversity; GARY ORFIELD,
DIVERSITY CHALLENGED (The Civil Rights Project, Harvard Univ. 2002); ALFIE KOHN, WHAT
TO LOOK FOR IN A CLASSROOM AND OTHER ESSAYS (Jossey-Bass 1998) (concluding that
genuine character or moral education would require students to practice perspective taking with
diverse students in their class).
115. See, e.g., Jane Bolgatz, Developing Racial Literacy: What Happens When Students and
Teachers Talk About Race, 2004. http://www.diversity-conference.com/ProposalSystem/
Presentations/P000465.
116. Id. See also KOHN, supra note 114.
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schools reduces racial prejudice and stereotypes and improves students'
citizenship values and their ability to succeed in a racially diverse society
in their adult lives."l 7  Interracial contact among children in schools
encourages tolerance, breaks down stereotypes, and decreases racial
prejudice-particularly during students' "formative years' 118  Research
further demonstrates that diverse public schools lead to a greater sense of
civic and political engagement and an increased desire to live and work in
multiracial settings as adults." 9 The social science research is consistent
and clear.12
0
Racial diversity in the classroom advances academic achievement
because it contributes to the process of learning. Education involves far
more than the transmission of knowledge from teacher to student.' 2 ' A
classroom occupied by students from diverse backgrounds exposes each to
a broader array of vantage points and experiences. Students learn by
formulating, revising, and refining conceptions of the world. 122  In
particular, students develop their cognitive abilities when shaken by new
facts, beliefs, experiences, and viewpoints. 123 If they are exposed to peers
117. See, Black, supra note 106, at 951-52.
118. Peter B. Wood & Nancy Sonleitner, The Effect of Childhood Interracial Contact on
Adult Antiblack Prejudice, 20 INT'LJ. OF INTERCULTURAL REL. 1, 14-15 (1996).
119. See Janet W. Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations: A Review of
the Literature, 17 REV. EDUC. RES. 335, 335-409 (1991); Lee Sigelman & Susan Welch, The
Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White Interaction and Positive Racial Attitudes, 71 SOC.
FORCES 781 (1993); Amy S. Wells et al., How Desegregation Changed Us: The Effects of
Racially Mixed Schools on Students and Society 15-18 (1994).
120. See Janet W. Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregation's Impact on
Elementary and Secondary School Students, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL
EDUCATION 597, 610 (James A. Banks ed., 2d ed. 2004); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects
on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 741-42 (1998); Rita E.
Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in The
Consequences of School Desegregation 103, 111, 113 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley
eds., 1983).
121. The word "educate" derives from the Latin "educe," "to draw out." Ideas must be
"utilized, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations." ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, THE
ORGANIZATION OF THOUGHT, EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 4 (1974). "There is only one
subject-matter for education and that is Life in all its manifestations." Id. at 13. See also JOHN
DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 5-6 (Free Press 1966) (1916) ("[O]ne has to assimilate,
imaginatively, something of another's experience in order to tell him intelligently of one's own
experience.").
122. Peter B. Pufall, The Development of Thought: On Perceiving and Knowing, in
PERCEIVING, ACTING AND KNOWING: TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 173-74 (Robert
Shaw & John Bransford eds.,1977).
123. "Disequilibration," which is the student's positive struggle to restore cognitive balance
when confronted with cognitive dissonance, has the greatest impact when it comes from "social
interaction." See Piaget's Theory, in 1 CARMICHAEL'S MANUAL OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY (P.H.
Mussen eds., 3d ed. Wiley 1970).
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who have new, different or unexpected ways of looking at the world,
students will fully explore and absorb those perspectives. Under settled
principles of developmental psychology, racial diversity in an educational
environment prompts students of all races to develop their minds through
exposure to new perspectives, experiences, and the cognitive struggle that
leads to critical thought.
12 4
A racially diverse classroom also leads students to overcome the false
assumption that all members of one race think alike or share the same
viewpoint.15 Diversity in the educational environment enables students to
experience the error of their own stereotypes, and to learn that there is a
broad range of experiences and perspectives within minority
communities.12 6  Accordingly, professional educators may credibly
establish a guideline for the nature and extent of racial diversity in the
classrooms that will lead to these precise educational outcomes.
Any such decision to assign a student to a particular school or
classroom in order to create a pedagogically meaningful number of diverse
students in that environment and thereby realize these benefits will not be
driven by a racial quota or by the effort to achieve racial balance for its
own sake. To the contrary, the school seeks to assign meaningful numbers
of diverse students in its educational institution in order to realize its
compelling educational interests. Such a plan would reason "forward" to
the creation of the level of racial diversity required to meet the district's
precise educational goals. 127  A school district that seeks to maintain a
relatively stable critical mass of white and nonwhite students in each of its
schools does so in order to produce the educational benefits derived from
an educational environment with a "meaningful" number of students from
different racial groups. A nuanced student assignment plan designed to
foster the educational benefits recognized to flow from meaningful
124. See, e.g., MICHAL KURLAENDER & JOHN T. YUN, THE IMPACT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DIVERSITY ON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: CAMBRIDGE, MA SCHOOL DISTRICT 2 (The Civil
Rights Project, Harvard Univ. 2002) (finding that students in diverse schools "increased their
level of understanding of diverse points of view, and enhanced their desire to interact with people
of different backgrounds in the future").
125. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
126. See Jonathan R. Alger, The Educational Value of Diversity, 83 ACADEME 20, 21 (Jan.-
Feb. 1997) ("For example, by seeing firsthand that all black or Hispanic students do not think
alike, white students can overcome learned prejudices that may have arisen in part from a lack of
direct exposure to individuals of other races.").
127. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, From Lexis:
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2757*, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508, 529, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8670 (2007) (Roberts, J.,
plurality opinion). *All pagination subject to change pending release of the final published
version. (criticizing Seattle and Jefferson County for reasoning backward from racial balance for
its own sake).
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numbers of white and nonwhite students in a particular school must
necessarily attempt to achieve those meaningful numbers. 128
2. Serious Consideration of Workable Race-Neutral Alternatives
In PICS' the Supreme Court explained that narrow tailoring also
"[r]equire[s] serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks."' 129
As discussed in Section III, there may be school districts in which
student assignment plans based on socio-economic status, or race-
conscious strategic site selection and attendance zoning of certain schools
will result in a meaningful number of racially diverse students in a
particular school. Yet, while race-neutrality as an abstract matter may be
preferable to explicit but nuanced racial classifications of students, race-
neutrality cannot be required where it will not serve the interest deemed
compelling. Because producing the educational benefits of racial literacy is
a compelling interest, a school district may permissibly seek that interest if
its means are narrowly tailored to achieve that precise interest. Race-
conscious but broad based efforts to achieve a racially-diverse classroom
without resorting to racial classification of students generally do not work.
None of these efforts are tailored to serve the interest of teaching racial
literacy. They cannot replace precisely tailored efforts to create a
pedagogically meaningful number of diverse students in a classroom in
order to achieve the district's educational goal of racial literacy. A school
district that seeks to accomplish its compelling educational objective of
teaching racial literacy by means of race-conscious student assignments,
therefore, may establish that its assignments are a "last resort" and
therefore constitutional method of achieving that precise objective.
V. A Majority of the Court Recognizes that Race-Conscious
Integration Strategies by Public School Districts are
Constitutional Under Authentic Standards of Equal Protection
The Plurality Opinion in PICS is based on an understanding of equal
protection doctrine that presumes that all race-conscious decisions by
governmental officials are unconstitutional. As demonstrated in this
section, the Plurality's presumption that race-conscious decisions violate
"equal protection" is contrary to any authentic application of the Equal
Protection Clause and the principle of equality on which it is based.
128. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 ("[S]ome attention to numbers, without more, does not
transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.") (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
129. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added)).
Moreover, a majority of the Court's members seem to have recognized that
any such authentic application of the Equal Protection Clause must be
based on a presumption that there are in fact racial differences in
educational opportunities that would justify differential treatment based on
race.
A. Justice Roberts' Presumption that Race-Conscious Decisions Violate
the Principle of Equality is Unfounded
1. Justice Roberts' Doctrinal Proposition That Race-Conscious
Governmental Action is Unconstitutional has a Dubious Lineage
The Supreme Court's three-tiered Equal Protection Clause analysis
evolved from the Court's suspicion that legislation classifying persons
based on race was designed to disadvantage members of a racial
minority.130 Under that analysis, a governmental educational program that
affects a "suspect class," like an underrepresented racial minority, will be
strictly scrutinized to determine whether it violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.131 The source for such heightened scrutiny is often traced to
footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products.132 Yet, that footnote
was designed at most to suggest exceptions to the presumption of
constitutionality usually given to legislation. 133  The Carolene Products
Court cautioned that the presumption of constitutionality may be
"narrower" where the challenged legislation is within a "specific
prohibition of the Constitution," or where the law "restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal of
undesirable legislation" or is "directed at particular religious
[minorities], . . . national [minorities] ... racial minorities ... [or] discrete
130. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). See also Lucy Katz,
Public Affirmative Action & the Fourteenth Amendment: The Fragmentation of Theory after
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 317, 339 (1992).
131. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 561 (1982) (citing
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980)). See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("[a]ll legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect");
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry... [are] odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality" (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
132. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 290 n.28 (1978).
133. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152, n.4. See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980) (expanding upon the footnote's suggestions to create a theory of judicial review
based upon the Court's role in protecting the democratic political process).
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and insular minorities.
1 34
While the Court questioned whether "exacting judicial scrutiny" might
be appropriate in these circumstances, it never suggested overturning the
presumption that legislation is constitutionally valid. Nevertheless, under
the "strict scrutiny" standard reasserted by Justice Roberts, any state
regulation that classifies people based on their race is presumed to violate
the Equal Protection Clause; that presumption is unassailable unless the
state can show that the challenged law is finely tailored to achieve a
compelling or substantial state interest.' 35  Justice Roberts' presumption
that all racial classifications are presumed to violate the Equal Protection
Clause thus finds little support in the origins of the strict scrutiny doctrine.
2. Justice Roberts' Failure to Recognize the Possibility of Racial Difference
in Educational Opportunities Leads to His Unfounded Presumption that
Race-Conscious Decisions Violate the Principle of Equality
Justice Roberts' presumption that race-conscious decisions are
unconstitutional not only has a questionable precedential foundation, it is
contrary to the principle of equality itself. As Aristotle fully understood,
his maxim that "like cases should be treated in a like manner," 136 and that
"unlike cases should be treated in an unlike manner"1 37 requires both a
descriptive analysis of the "likeness" of citizens and a normative analysis
of the propriety of their treatment by the law. 138 Even if a regime presumes
that all persons are entitled by their nature to equal protection of the laws,
important judgments about which cases are in fact alike and which cases
should be treated alike cannot be resolved without standards independent of
equality.
134. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152, n.4.
135. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, From Lexis: 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2752*, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508, 523, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8670 (2007). *Allpagination subject
to change pending release of the final published version. See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 270 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). See generally Angelo N.
Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race Conscious Policy Making, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 21
(2004).
136. See Westen, supra note 131, at 543 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, book 111.9 1280a;
111.12. 1282b - 1283a; V. 1. 1301a - 1301b. (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press 1921)).
137. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, book III. 9. 1280a; book III. 12. 1282b (Benjamin Jowett
trans., Clarendon Press 1921).
138. Aristotle recognized that each regime would have to reach the political judgment about
whether its citizens were "like" or "unalike." He understood that linking justice with equality
begged the political question of the relevance of similarities and differences: "All men agree that
what is just in distribution should be according to merit of some sort, but not all men agree as to
what that merit should be .... ARISTOTLE, supra note 136, at 113 1a.
Once these judgments are made, however, the equality maxim appears
to call into question laws that treat like cases in an unlike manner.
Presuming the constitutionality of laws that treat like cases in a like manner
seems to be consistent with the equality maxim. Yet, the equality maxim
also calls into question laws that treat unlike cases in a like manner; the
maxim should lead to a presumption against the constitutionality of those
laws. Laws that treat like cases in a like manner and unlike cases in an
unlike manner should enjoy a presumption of constitutionality under the
equality principle.
In a seminal series of publications, Professor Peter Westen shows that
Aristotle's principle of equality is circular, 139 and cannot be employed to
resolve any jurisprudential question without reference to "substantive"
values or rights wholly apart from equality itself.140  Professor Westen
dissects each part of the Aristotelian equality principle. First, the formula
requires a determination of whether two or more persons are, or should be
deemed, alike for the purpose of applying the equality principle. 141
Because no two persons are truly alike, that determination depends on a
judgment about the relevance of the undeniable differences between
people. People are alike only if their differences are judged irrelevant by
some external standard.
142
Second, Westen shows that "treatments can be alike only in reference
to some moral rule.' 4 3 The same moral rule or independent legal standard
that determines the relevance of people's similarities and dissimilarities
also determines whether people should or should not be treated alike under
the law. A law cannot be judged, therefore, by the extent to which it treats
people equally. Westen concludes that the constitutional concept of equal
protection under the law is "an empty vessel with no substantive moral
content of its own."'144 Accordingly, an idea of justice based solely on the
principle of equality is meaningless without a "substantive moral or legal
standard[ ] that determine[s] what is one's 'due'.' 45
139. Westen acknowledges that this insight into the circular nature of "equality" is not new.
Indeed, he posits that Aristotle's equality maxim has had staying power partly because it
expresses an unassailable tautology. Westen, supra note 131, at 574-78.
140. Westen, supra note 131, at 561. See also Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in
Law, Science, Math and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REv. 604 (1983) [hereinafter Westen
Reply]; PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF
EQUALITY IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990) [hereinafter SPEAKING OF EQUALITY].
141. Westen, supra note 131, at 543.
142. Id. at 544.
143. Id. at 547.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 557. Any principle of justice based on this empty idea of equality is vacuous as
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well. The foundation of justice is "giving every person his due." Id. at 556. The equality
principle's declaration that persons who are alike should be treated alike indicates that treating
people equally means giving them their "due." To argue that justice requires that persons who
are alike should be treated alike, therefore, has no genuine meaning unless the argument contains
some moral basis for determining whether they are alike in such a way as to make morally proper
their similar treatment. Id. at 557.
Shortly after Westen authored his seminal work, a host of scholars feverishly attempted to
inject some independent meaning into the idea of equality. Westen, however, effectively
discarded these arguments. More recently, Professors Christopher Peters and Kent Greenwalt
have tried to resurrect the principle of equality. Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110
HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1211 (1997) (arguing that equality's requirement that identical matters
receive identical treatment is not empty); Kent Greenwalt, "Prescriptive Equality:" Two Steps
Forward, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1273 (arguing the principle of equality carries normative
force).
Professor Peters argues that the principle of "prescriptive equality" is not meaningless.
Peters, supra, at 1211. Under this principle, the "bare fact that a person has been treated in a
certain way is a reason in itself for treating another identically situated person in the same way."
Id. at 1223. Once it is determined that two persons are identically situated, Peters contends, the
equality principle has meaning because it requires their identical treatment. Id. at 1217. Peters
concedes, however, that if this prescriptive principle does have any meaning, that meaning is
misguided because it may lead to treating equals equally, even if that treatment is unjust. Id. For
example, Professor Peters imagines a situation in which eleven drowning people compete for only
ten available spots on a lifeboat. Id. at 1237. Because prescriptive equality demands that all of
them be treated equally, none of them may receive spots in the lifeboat and all of them equally
may drown. Accordingly, Peters concludes that the principle of equality is either irrelevant or
harmful when there are conditions of scarcity. Id. at 1238-39.
Professor Greenwalt agrees with Peters that the principle of equality does not always lead to
"right action." Greenwalt, supra, at 1273. Still, Greenwalt contends that the equality principle
has presumptive force because it "might pull some people to treat equals equally, although other
considerations would suggest a different outcome." Id. at 1277. For example, the principle of
equality creates a presumption favoring equal distributions of lifeboat spots, but that presumption
may be rebutted by stronger values, like saving lives. Id.
These scholars' efforts to resurrect the equality principle ultimately are unavailing. First, as
Westen established in anticipating these efforts, any judicial allegiance to a deeply rooted
presumption favoring equal treatment is ultimately indeterminate and obfuscates judgments
independent of equality. The equality principle cannot support a presumption opposing laws that
treat persons differently because all laws treat some people differently from others for some
purposes. Second, and more importantly, the Court's presumption favoring equal treatment for
all is inconsistent with the maxim of equality itself. Once again, the equality principle requires
not only that like cases be treated in a like manner, but also that unlike cases be treated in an
unlike manner.
Absent from the debate about the meaning of equality is any serious discussion of whether
cases are in fact alike. Greenwalt, Peters and even Westen focus their attention on the
presumption favoring the like treatment of like cases. They assume that the cases at issue are
alike, and question whether the law treats them in a like manner. Hence, Peters' arguments about
the possible injustice of treating like cases in a like manner (i.e., all drowning persons are treated
the same, but they all die), do not question the basis for determining whether the cases are in fact
"alike." Greenwalt also argues that deeply rooted feelings favor like treatment, but only after it is
determined that the cases at issue are in fact alike. Yet, the equality maxim contains absolutely
no presumption favoring like treatment. To the contrary, that maxim demands unlike treatment
where it is determined that the persons affected by the treatment are in fact not alike.
Westen's most important contribution to serious thought about
equality may well be his critique of the abuses of the "equality" principle in
legal and political discourse surrounding the constitution's Equal
Protection Clause. Once one concedes that the Equal Protection Clause
does not require all persons to be treated alike, that clause, like the equality
principle itself, cannot be interpreted without relying upon a legal or moral
standard anterior to equality. Even scholars who doubt Westen's premise
that equality is meaningless cannot deny his assertion that the Court's
judicial interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, in the context of
education at least, cannot be explained by the empty rhetoric of equality.
146
The opinion in Sweatt v. Painter, in which the Supreme Court held
that a state statute barring African-American students from attending an all
white law school violates the Equal Protection Clause, is a prime
example.1 47 It is meaningless to assert that Sweatt should be admitted to
the all-white school simply because "like cases should be treated in a like
manner. '' 14' Rather, "[t]he real question... was whether Sweatt's race
would be allowed to make a constitutional difference between Sweatt and
his white co-applicants.,
149
That question can only be answered by a "substantive idea of the
kinds of wrongs from which a person has the right to be free."' 50 In order
to conclude that racial differences are "constitutionally irrelevant" for
admissions purposes, a court must decide that "excluding blacks from law
school on the basis of race causes them a kind of injury not caused in cases
in which using race is conceded to be acceptable." 151 If, but only if, the
Court determines that Sweatt has the right to be free from the injury of
being denied admission to an all-white school because of his race, can the
court then say that the state has treated him unequally by treating him
differently from persons who the court has independently determined are
the "same" in constitutionally relevant respects.1 52 The decision to allow
Sweatt to be treated "like" white applicants in admissions to law school is
based on the independent judgment that African-American applicants to
146. Id. at 557. See, e.g., William Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality as a
Surrogate for Other Rights, 59 TUL. L. REV. 884, 902 (1985) (arguing that judges use equality as
a rationale for deciding cases which are really based on other substantive values in order to
"avoid larger issues").
147. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
148. Westen, supra note 131, at 566-67.
149. Id. at 566.
150. Id. at 567.
151. Id. at 566.
152. Id. at 567.
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law school should not be subjected to racial injury in admissions. 153
From this perspective, not even Brown v. Board of Education, which
stands as an enduring symbol of racial equality, can be justified by the
equality principle alone. 154  The Court in Brown declared that racially
segregated educational facilities are "inherently unequal."'155 As Westen
shows, however, there is no such thing as "inherent" inequality. The actual
reasoning of Brown is that state laws that impose racial segregation in
public education violate the Equal Protection Clause because they injure
African-American school children. According to Brown, even if such laws
were to provide for equal educational resources, they would nevertheless be
unconstitutional because they would have a "detrimental effect" on
African-American students. 156 The Court emphasized that the laws (1)
perpetuate a stereotype harmful to African-American students; (2) reinforce
a stigma of inferiority injurious to African-American students; (3) generate
a feeling of lesser status that hurts the hearts and minds of African-
American students; (4) retard the mental and educational development of
African-American students; and, (5) deny to African-American students the
educational benefits of attending a racially integrated school.157  As in
Sweatt, the Brown case becomes consistent with equality only after it is
first determined that African-American children are "like" white children in
their right to be free from the "injury" of being denied the opportunity to
attend a diverse school. Brown can be understood only by looking to these
important substantive values apart from equality.
Because the rhetoric of equality is hollow, Justice Roberts is able to
use that rhetoric in PICS to attempt to undercut the substantive values of
Brown. Repeating that "[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own
153. Id. at 568.
154. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregating children in
public schools on the basis of race is unconstitutional, even when both facilities and tangible
factors are equal, because children are still deprived of equal educational opportunities).
155. Id. at 495. The Brown Court actually goes out of its way to make clear that some of the
schools at issue in that case which were attended by African-American students were "like" the
schools attended by white students in their tangible facilities and resources. Id. at 492. The Court
declares that the racially segregated schools in the case, "have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other
'tangible' factors." Id.
156. Id. at 494.
157. Id. at 494-95. For an excellent analysis of the judicial and political efforts to facilitate
the resegregation of American public schools, see generally GARY ORFIELD, ET AL.,
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(The New Press 1996) (describing the current segregated condition of America's schools). See
also JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (Crown
Publishers 1991) (describing the detrimental effects of unequal government funding to America's
schools).
sake,"'158 the Plurality indicates that state desegregation efforts violate the
Equal Protection Clause unless they are finely tailored to remedy proven
cases of legally mandated or intentionally imposed segregation, or the
compelling interest that institutions of higher education may assert in broad
based diversity. 159  State programs designed to make or encourage racial
integration, or even to make desegregation attractive by enhancing the
quality of schools attended by African-American students violate the Equal
Protection Clause, the Plurality suggests, because they treat African-
American students differently from white students. 160  By this logic,
African-American students are deemed to be "like" white students in all
respects relevant to educational opportunity and therefore they must be
treated like white students with regard to educational programs. The
Plurality's rhetoric here hides its substantive judgment that any differences
between the actual educational opportunities afforded white children and
those afforded African-American children either do not exist or are
irrelevant for constitutional purposes. The declaration that African-
American students should be treated just like white students is used to
legitimize the reality that their educational opportunities are not at all alike.
158. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. (PICS) v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, From Lexis: 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2757*, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508, 529, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8670 (2007) (Roberts, J., plurality
opinion). *All pagination subject to change pending release of the final published version.
(quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)). "Where resegregation is a product not of
state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond the
authority ... of the federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive
demographic shifts." Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495. Freeman indicates that any voluntary
governmental policy designed to achieve racial balance in educational institutions generally
would itself violate the principle of equality in the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
159. See, e.g., PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2753. See also Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495-96 (noting that
though past wrongs have been committed to the black race, those wrongs cannot be used to
exaggerate the legal consequences). Specifically, the Freeman court noted:
Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a
stubborn fact of history.... But though we cannot escape our history, neither must we
overstate its consequences in fixing legal responsibilities .... [T]he District Court was correct
to entertain the suggestion that [the school district] had no duty to achieve system-wide racial
balance in the student population.
Id.; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88-90 (1995) (holding that efforts to integrate
school district by developing attractive schools designed to equalize academic achievement are
unconstitutional and beyond the scope of permissible remedies for equal protection violations).
160. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2757-2758. See also Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88-89 (discussing the state
program's unequal treatment of students based on race).
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B. The Plurality's Presumption Against Educational Programs That
Differentiate Based on Race is Contrary to Authentic Principles of
Equality and Equal Protection
As Westen shows, the question of whether individuals are "alike"
cannot be answered by the principle of equality, but depends on standards
anterior to equality. Because no two persons are alike, the judicial system
must create a mechanism for determining the significance of differences
among individuals. The mechanism must have a descriptive and a
normative component. The descriptive component provides a legitimate
method of assessing actual, real-world conditions of relevant difference.
The normative component provides a legitimate method of assessing which
differences should be recognized as morally significant. The moral or
normative proposition that all men are created equal, for instance, may help
to explain the presumption that all individuals are like cases and thus
should receive like treatment.
Yet that normative proposition is not a descriptive one. In fact, the
premise that all men are created equal says nothing about whether
individuals are in fact "alike" for any particular purpose. The premise that
all individuals should be treated equally regardless of race permeates the
Supreme Court's Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. That premise,
however, obfuscates the fact that individuals may not be alike in relevant
factual ways, and creates the unfounded presumption favoring laws that
treat unlike cases as if they were alike. The racial differences in
educational opportunities, facilities, and outcomes are undisputed by all
credible researchers.' 61 Only by ignoring undisputed facts does the
161. See MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 414, 441, 442, 526-532 (Aspen Publishers 2005). See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 298-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that an equal
standard of review in the college admission process will not remedy an unequal society). The
"detrimental effect" on African-American students from educational inequity has not dissipated
since Brown. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Racial segregation in public schools persists. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (contending that a
continuing affirmative action policy will not fuel an unequal college admissions policy, rather it
will alleviate the need for affirmative action); ERICA FRANKENBERG, ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 1, 4 (The Civil Rights
Project, Harvard Univ. 2003) (indicating that figures for the years 2000-2001 show that 71.6% of
African-American children and 76.3% of Hispanic children attended schools in which minorities
make up a majority of the school body); see also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (Oxford Univ. Press
2004) (discussing continued segregation in modem American schools); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE
FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM
(Public Affairs 2004) (describing how race and social class categorization can restrict upward
mobility); GARY ORFIELD & CHRISTOPHER LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S
NIGHTMARE? (The Civil Rights Project, Harvard Univ. 2004) (showing that U.S. schools are
Plurality in PICS presume a lack of racial difference in education.
Authentic principles of equality therefore cannot support Justice
Robert's presumption against the unconstitutionality of laws that treat
students differently based on race unless the Court determines-contrary to
all evidence-that such students are in fact alike. The Plurality declares
that "all racial classifications ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.' 62 Yet, Justice Roberts does not perform any serious
analysis of whether the persons affected by the law are in fact like cases.
The Carolene Products footnote, which was designed to justify treating
some classes differently from others, has led Justice Roberts to presume
that those classes should be treated the same as others. Perhaps the
assumption that persons should be treated the same regardless of race has
led the Chief Justice to presume that they are in fact the same.
Accordingly, he presumes that governmental programs that classify persons
based on race are unconstitutional absent a showing that the different
treatment is finely tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Yet, Justice
Roberts never really determines whether the persons treated are in fact like
cases. He is willing to engage in moral determinations about whether
differential legal treatments are appropriate, but generally is unwilling to
engage in factual determinations about whether persons affected by
governmental programs are actually different. Any serious analysis of the
question of whether educational opportunities available to white Americans
are like those available to African-Americans would result in the
unassailable conclusion that the dramatic difference in their opportunities
becoming more segregated); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 273-
74 (1999) (discussing the difficulties of achieving racial integration); KEVIN CAREY, THE
FUNDING GAP: Low INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS STILL RECEIVE FEWER DOLLARS IN
MANY STATES 1, 9 (The Education Trust 2003) (indicating that thirty-seven states provide
significantly fewer cost-adjusted resources to those school districts which educate mostly
underrepresented minority students and that throughout the nation, each student in a district
which educates primarily underrepresented minorities receives an average of $1,030 less in
annual educational resources than students who are educated in a primarily white district).
Ironically, the Court is careful to consider relevant facts when it conducts its far less exacting
review of legislation under the rational basis standard. Even in facial equal protection challenges
to legislation, the Supreme Court has made clear that rational basis analysis cannot be conducted
without considering the factual circumstances surrounding the legislation. In Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996), the Supreme Court reviewed the factual circumstances surrounding
Colorado's enactment of a Constitutional amendment that precluded governmental action
designed to enable persons of "gay, lesbian or bisexual orientation" to pursue legal claims.
Significantly, the Court explained that when a governmental enactment passes the rational basis
test, it does so because the Court has found that the law is "grounded in a sufficient factual
context for [the Court] to ascertain some relation between the classification and the purpose it
served." Id.
162. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2762 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1993)).
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cannot justify a presumption of like treatment.
C. A Majority of the Justices in PICS Recognize That Actual Racial
Differences in Educational Opportunities Are Relevant to Authentic
Equal Protection Analysis
Together with the four dissenters, Justice Kennedy subtly rejects the
Plurality's understanding of the Equal Protection Clause and its premise
that racial differences do not exist in educational opportunities.
1. A Majority of the Court Would Not Apply Strict Scrutiny to Race-
Conscious Integration Strategies
Justice Breyer and the dissenters make explicit that they would reject
strict scrutiny analysis for racial classifications that are designed to include,
rather than exclude, African Americans in educational programs. In doing
so, the dissenters observe a trend in the Supreme Court's recent opinions
toward recognizing that Equal Protection Clause analysis does not require
strict scrutiny of all racial classifications. The Supreme Court recently has
recognized that the "fundamental purpose" of strict scrutiny review is to
"take relevant differences" between "fundamentally different situations...
into account." 163 The Court also has made clear that "[s]trict scrutiny does
not trea[t] dissimilar race-based decisions as though they were equally
objectionable. 164  Moreover, the fact that a law "treats [a person]
unequally because of his or her race ... says nothing about the ultimate
validity of any particular law."' 165 Indeed, the Supreme Court, using the
same phrase that Justice Marshall had used to describe strict scrutiny's
application to any exclusionary use of racial criteria, has tried to "dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny" is as likely to condemn inclusive uses of "race-
conscious" criteria as it is to invalidate exclusionary uses. 16 6 That is, it is
not in all circumstances "'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."",167 More
recently, the Court in Grutter elaborated: "Strict scrutiny is not 'strict in
theory, but fatal in fact.' ... Although all governmental uses of race are
subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. ...
According to the dissenters, a subtler standard than strict scrutiny
would not signal abandoning judicial efforts to carefully consider the
163. Id. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-230 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
168. Id.
rationality and tailoring of race-conscious criteria in light of legitimate
school district needs. The dissenters also caution that a court must examine
carefully the race-conscious program at issue, and a reviewing judge must
be fully aware of "potential dangers and pitfalls."'' 6
9
But, unlike the Plurality, such a judge also would be aware that a
legislature or school board, which is ultimately accountable to the
electorate, could properly conclude that a racial classification sometimes
serves a compelling purpose such as helping to end racial isolation or
helping to achieve a diverse student body in public schools. 170  The
dissenters would ask the judge to examine the program's details to
determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is proportionate to the
important ends it serves. In the dissent's view, therefore, a contextual
approach to scrutiny is appropriate. The Equal Protection Clause requires
application of a standard of review that is not "strict" in the traditional
sense of that word.
17 1
Significantly, Justice Kennedy agrees with the dissenters that not all
race-conscious educational strategies should be subjected to strict scrutiny:
Apparently JUSTICE KENNEDY also agrees that strict scrutiny would
not apply in respect to certain "race-conscious" school board
policies.... ("Executive and legislative branches, which for
generations now have considered these types of policies and
procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor and
with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur
whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach
might have on students of different races"). 7 2
A majority of the Court, therefore, has concluded that not all racial
classifications should be judged the same way under the Equal Protection
Clause. Indeed, significant race-conscious strategies designed to serve
compelling interests in racial integration need not be subjected to strict
scrutiny.
169. Id. at 2819.
170. Id.
171. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J.,
dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 242-249 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,, 426 F.3d 1162, 1193-1194 (2005)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
172. PICS, 127 S. Ct.. at 2819 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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2. A Majority of the Court Would Not Presume Racial Equality in
Educational Opportunities
A majority of the Court also rejects the Plurality's understanding of
the principle of equality within the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Kennedy declares that it would be a profound mistake to ignore the reality
of racial segregation in the nation's schools.1 7 3 He and the four dissenters
acknowledge that the educational opportunities available to African-
American students are different from those available to white students
because of their different history of injury from a legally enforced "racial
caste system" in education, their different condition of injury from
"conscious and unconscious race bias," their different condition of injury
from educational segregation, and their different condition of injury from
inadequate educational resources. As Justice Ginsburg has recognized,
"[o]ur jurisprudence ranks race a 'suspect' category, 'not because [race] is
inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one which
usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of
maintaining racial inequality."",1
74
Put another way, racial classifications should not be presumed to be
"impermissible" where they are designed to eradicate rather than to
maintain the actual condition of racial inequality. Governmental programs
that treat races differently are not invalid under the Constitution if there is a
legitimate determination that the races are in fact different in a respect that
is relevant to the precise issue confronting the Court. For Justice Ginsburg,
and a majority of the Court, the starting point for a serious Equal Protection
Clause analysis is whether the individuals who are affected by a
governmental program are in fact different.
Justice Kennedy, along with Justice Ginsburg and the PICS dissenters,
recognizes the relevance of racial differences in the application of equal
protection. He acknowledges "the reality [that race] too often does"
matter. 75  Contrary to the Plurality's "unyielding insistence that race
cannot be a factor" in governmental programs, Justice Kennedy declares
that race and racial differences "may be taken into account," particularly
where school districts seek to "reach Brown's objective of equal
educational opportunity.' ' 176 According to Justice Kennedy, the Plurality's
willingness to ignore the fact of racial segregation and subordination,
173. Id.
174. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (quoting Norwalk Core v. Norwalk
Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968)).
175. PICS, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
176. Id.
therefore, is "profoundly mistaken."'' 77 Ultimately, Justice Kennedy rejects
the Plurality's push toward an entirely "color-blind" principle of equality in
the Constitution: "[A]s an aspiration, Justice Harlan's axiom must
command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be
a universal constitutional principle."'
78
VI. Conclusion
In PICS, a majority of the Supreme Court reaffirms the
constitutionality of a school district's use of race-conscious strategies
designed to achieve the compelling benefits of a racially diverse student
body. The Majority rejects the Plurality's effort to write into the
constitution an Equal Protection Clause that disregards race. Instead, a
majority of the Court seriously questions whether governmental actions
that recognize and remediate real racial differences in educational
opportunities should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Indeed, the Majority seems to have recognized the authentic principle
of equality within the Equal Protection Clause. In many cases, African-
American children in fact are not like white schoolchildren in their
educational opportunities. A school district's program that recognizes
those differences and treats African-American schoolchildren differently
from white school children in order to achieve the goal of ultimately
eradicating those differences is true to the principle of equality.
Accordingly, the Court actually rejects Justice Roberts' vacuous
statement that the way to stop racial discrimination is to stop discriminating
based on race. Instead, a majority of the Court recognizes that the way to
provide equal educational opportunities to children of all races is to allow
school districts to provide equal educational opportunities to children of all
races.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2792.
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